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Abstract—As the applications of deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) in wireless communications grow, sensitivity of DRL based
wireless communication strategies against adversarial attacks has
started to draw increasing attention. In order to address such
sensitivity and alleviate the resulting security concerns, we in
this paper consider a victim user that performs DRL-based
dynamic channel access, and an attacker that executes DRL-
based jamming attacks to disrupt the victim. Hence, both the
victim and attacker are DRL agents and can interact with each
other, retrain their models, and adapt to opponents’ policies. In
this setting, we initially develop an adversarial jamming attack
policy that aims at minimizing the accuracy of victim’s decision
making on dynamic channel access. Subsequently, we devise
defense strategies against such an attacker, and propose three
defense strategies, namely diversified defense with proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) control, diversified defense with an
imitation attacker, and defense via orthogonal policies. We design
these strategies to maximize the attacked victims accuracy and
evaluate their performances.
Index Terms—Adversarial policies, defense strategies, dynamic
channel access, deep reinforcement learning, jamming attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been growing interest in employing ma-
chine learning to address certain challenges in communication
systems, such as modulation classification [1], user association
and resource allocation [2], power control for interference
management [3] and dynamic multichannel access [4]. In par-
ticular, dynamic access is a typical long-term control problem
that is generally modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP)
or a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP).
In addressing these problems, several recent studies considered
the application of deep reinforcement learning (DRL), taking
advantage of its ability to explore, learn and adapt in unknown
environments. For instance, the authors of [4] proposed a deep
Q-network (DQN) to learn the channel switching pattern and
make channel selection decisions. In [5] and [6], DQNs are
used to allocate the spectral resources in time-division multiple
access and orthogonal frequency-division multiple access net-
works, respectively, with the aims to effectively utilize these
resources in a multi-user setting. Instead of only learning
the patterns in the environment, DRL algorithms can also be
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used to account for the intrinsic temporal correlations among
sequential decisions. Such a DQN framework is proposed in
[7] with the goal to utilize the spectral resources and reduce
the co-channel interference in multibeam satellite systems.
Moreover, DRL algorithms are also applied to jointly solve
the multichannel access and task offloading in mobile edge
computing as presented in [8]. Aside from the frequently
used DQN, recent research has also explored the application
of other DRL algorithms in solving these types of dynamic
control problems. For instance, authors in [8] made use of
the actor-critic framework, while a multi-agent deep stochastic
policy gradient framework was proposed in [9] for dynamic
spectrum access problems.
While significant strides have been made in solving the
aforementioned problems, this increasing interest in applying
machine learning algorithms to communication systems also
brings forth potential security risks due to adversarial attacks.
Since machine learning methods are highly data-driven al-
gorithms, even a minor modification in the observation data
can lead to dramatic changes in the learning-based decision
policies [10]. Therefore, adversarial machine learning has been
intensively studied to better understand the vulnerabilities of
machine learning methods.
In particular, in the literature, adversarial attacks have
been considered and widely applied to deep learning-based
classification problems, such as the classification of images
[11] [12] [13], time series [14] and sound events [15]. In
these cases, the victim models are trained and fixed, and the
input data is accessible to the attacker, so that the attack can
be realized by crafting adversarial examples to mislead the
victim’s decisions. This idea is also used in the attack on
reinforcement learning-based tasks [16] and [17]. However, in
certain control problems, the observations of the reinforcement
learning agents are not available to the attacker, making it
infeasible to craft any adversarial examples. To tackle this
difficulty, in [18], the authors trained a reinforcement learning-
based adversarial policy instead. It is proved that adversarial
jamming attack with either white-box or black-box setting
may also lead to significant performance degradation [19].
Regarding adversarial attacks in wireless systems, a deep
learning-based wireless jamming attack has been studied in
[20] and [21], in both of which, the system consists of a single
transmitter, a receiver, one background traffic source whose
activity decides the channel state and a deep learning-based
jammer.
We finally note that in addition to adversarial attacks,
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there is a growing body of work introducing various defense
strategies against adversarial attacks on deep learning schemes
(e.g., using convolutional neural networks [22]–[24] and deep
reinforcement learning [25]). Adversarial jamming attacks also
stimulate further investigation on corresponding mitigating
strategies against such attacks [26].
Motivated by these considerations, we in this paper address
a scenario in which a well-trained victim user performs DRL-
based dynamic channel access [27]. We first design a DRL
based jamming attacker that employs a dynamic policy and
aims at minimizing victim’s channel access accuracy. Both
the victim user and jamming attacker can learn effective
strategies with feedback from each other over time. There-
fore, in this setting, we address a dynamic control problem
[28]. Subsequently, we develop defense strategies for the
victim user. In particular, we propose diversified defense
with proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control, diversified
defense with imitation attacker, and defense via orthogonal
policies to mitigate the jamming attack and maximize victim’s
accuracy of accessing channels with favorable conditions [29].
To the best of our knowledge, we for the first time in this
paper analyze the interactions between a DRL-based dynamic
channel access agent and a DRL-based jamming attacker
agent. Our key contributions can summarized as follows:
• We design a DRL attacker agent that can observes
the environment partially (e.g., one channel at a time),
learns the channel access patterns of the victim user, and
performs jamming attacks. We also propose a novel stop-
retrain-attack (SRA) procedure for the attacker to observe
and attack the victim efficiently.
• We consider a practical setting in which both the vic-
tim and attacker start with black-box settings, where
they have no knowledge of each other’s model structure
(except in the diversified imitation defense strategy) or
parameters. We study their interactions with each other.
After interacting, both retrain their models to adapt to
each other over time.
• We propose diversified defense and orthogonal policies
defense strategies to protect the victim from being learned
by the attacker. We evaluate the performances of the
defense strategies and demonstrate significant improve-
ments in the victim user’s accuracy in dynamic channel
access.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the DRL based multichannel access
victim user model. In Section III, we introduce the proposed
DRL based jamming attacker, evaluate its performance and
also address the impact of power budget limitations. In Sec-
tions IV through VI, we develop and analyze three different
defense strategies: 1) diversified PID defense; 2) diversified
imitation defense; 3) defense via orthogonal policies. Finally,
we provide experiment results and address attack detection in
Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. DYNAMIC CHANNEL ACCESS POLICIES OF THE VICTIM
USER
In this section, we introduce the background on DRL based
dynamic multichannel access. As noted above, we consider an
Fig. 1. Round-robin switching pattern when two of the 16 channels is in
good condition and the switching probability is ρ = 0.95. The channel in good
state at a given time is indicated by white squares.
actor-critic DRL agent proposed in [27] as the victim user to
be attacked.
A. Channel Switching Pattern
In the considered dynamic multichannel access problem, the
time is slotted and the user selects one channel to access
at the beginning of each time slot. We assume that the
state of each channel switches between good and bad in a
certain probabilistic pattern. When the channel is in good
condition, the user can transmit data successfully. Otherwise,
a transmission failure will occur. We also assume that the
channel switching pattern can be modeled as a Markov chain,
and in each state of which, there are k out of the N channels in
good condition. At the beginning of each time slot, the channel
pattern can either switch to the next state with probability of
ρ, or remain to be the same as the state in the last time slot
with probability of (1−ρ). In Fig. 1, we display a round-robin
switching pattern with two out of 16 channels being good in
each time slot and each channel has the same probability to
be in good state.
B. Actor-Critic Agent
It is assumed that the channel switching pattern is unknown
to the user, and the user can only observe the channel selected
in the current time slot. Hence, the multichannel access is a
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). To
help the user to access the good channels as frequently as
possible under such conditions, we proposed in [27] an actor-
critic deep reinforcement learning based agent to make the
channel access decisions in each time slot.
The proposed agent is designed to learn the channel switch-
ing pattern through past decisions and the corresponding
feedback from the channels. We assume that, at time t, the
channel state can be denoted as Xt = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, where
N is the total number of channels, xi stands for the state of
the ith channel. For each channel i, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
we have xi = 1 if the channel is in good state, or xi = 0 if
the channel is in bad state. And each time the agent senses a
channel, the state of the sensed channel is revealed to be either
good or bad. Therefore, we define the reward (feedback) as
follows: if a good channel is chosen, the reward rt will be
+1; otherwise, the reward rt will be −1.
The agent’s observation can be denoted as Ot =
{o1, o2, . . . , oN}, where N is the total number of channels. If
channel i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , is chosen, the agent senses it and
learns its state, so we define oi = rt; otherwise, the agent will
record oi = 0. The agent will learn on the basis of its previous
experience. We assume that the agent keeps an observation
space O that consists of the most recent M observations. The
observation space is initialized as an all-zero N ×M matrix,
and at each time t, the latest observation Ot will be added to
the observation space, and the oldest observation Ot−M will
be removed. The updated observation space O at time t + 1
can be denoted as Ot+1 = {Ot;Ot−1; . . . ;Ot−(M−1)}.
Next, we consider a discrete action space denoted by
A = {1, 2, . . . , N}, where N is the total number of channels.
Each valid action in the action space describes the index of
the channel that will be accessed. Hence, when an action is
chosen, the agent will access the corresponding channel and
receive the reward which reveals the condition of the chosen
channel. The agent can only choose one channel to sense/learn
in each iteration. The aim of the agent is to find a policy pi,
which maps the observation space O to the action space A,
that maximizes the long-term expected reward R of channel
access decisions:
pi∗ = arg max
pi
R
where pi∗ denotes the optimal decision policy, and in a finite
time duration T , we express R as
R =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rt.
And according to the definition of R, we have R ∈ [−1, 1].
C. Performance in the Absence of Jamming Attacks
We consider the channel switching pattern shown in Fig.
1, and evaluate the accuracy of the good channel access by
the user with N = M = 16. The evaluation is performed
in the absence of any jamming attacks and after the DRL
agent is well trained. In Fig. 2, we test the model in two
cases. First, we consider the -greedy policy with  = 0.1, with
which the user accesses a random channel with probability
0.1 (for exploration), and chooses the channel selected by the
reinforcement learning policy with probability 0.9. We note
that -greedy policies with  > 0 are generally employed to
enhance the DRL agent’s ability to adapt to changes in the
channel patterns, as will be discussed in detail in Section VII.
In addition, we also consider the case in which  is set to 0 to
identify the performance of the pure DRL policy. We observe
in the figure that high average accuracies (higher than 85%
and around 95% with  = 0.1 and  = 0, respectively) are
attained in the absence of jamming attacks.
III. DRL BASED JAMMING ATTACKER
In this section, we introduce an actor-critic DRL agent to
perform the jamming attack on the aforementioned victim
user without having any prior information about the channel
switching pattern or the victim’s action policy. The DRL
attacker is able to jam a single channel in each time slot to
significantly reduce the selection accuracy of the actor-critic
agent. We also assume that the DRL attacker is able to observe
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Fig. 2. Accuracy of the good channel access in the absence of jamming
attacks.
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Fig. 3. Diagram of actor-critic structure and DRL attacker-environment
interactions.
the victim’s interaction with the environment for a period of
time that is sufficiently long for the DRL attacker to learn the
activity pattern.
A. Actor-Critic Model
In Fig. 3, we show the diagram of the actor-critic structure
and the DRL attacker-environment interactions. The channels
and victim’s channel selection model form the environment to
be observed by the attacker. At the beginning of each time slot,
after the DRL attacker observes the environment, it can select
one channel based on its own observation and action policy
learned by the actor-critic neural networks. Here, it is noted
that the DRL victim also dynamically selects channels at the
beginning of each time slot based on the victim’s observations
and action policy. We assume that the attacker and victim
select channels without knowing the decision made by each
other in the current time slot. Then, the attacker’s reward and
the new state of the environment after executing the chosen
action will be sent to its critic neural network to calculate the
temporal difference (TD) error. This TD error will be used
to update both critic and actor neural networks. When the
update of network is completed, the DRL attacker model is
ready to make the next decision. Above, we have summarized
the operation of the attacker DRL agent. Next, we provide
more detailed descriptions regarding the observations, actions,
rewards of this attacker (or equivalently jamming) agent along
with its actor-critic structure.
Attacker Agent’s Observations: As mentioned before, the
DRL attacker agent has no knowledge of the channel patterns
and the victim user’s policy. Hence, from the perspective of the
DRL attacker agent, the channels and victim form an unknown
environment. And therefore, the only accessible information
that can be used as the states in the actor-critic neural networks
is the attacker agent’s observations. We assume that in each
time slot t, the observation of the DRL attacker is denoted
as Φt = {φt,1, φt,2, . . . , φt,N}. Then each element φt,i, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , stands for the observation in the ith channel at
time t. As assumed before, the DRL attacker can only choose
one channel at a time, so we have
φt,i =
{
rt if the ith channel is selected in time slot t,
0 if the ith channel is not selected in time slot t.
(1)
Above, 0 indicates that no information is available on a
channel that has not been selected. And in our implementation,
it is assumed that the DRL attacker can keep a memory
of the latest T observations, so that the memory forms the
observation space Φt = {Φt−1,Φt−2, . . . ,Φt−T } and use it
as the input of the DRL agent.
Attacker Agent’s Actions: The action space of the attacker
agent is formed by all valid actions that indicate which channel
to jam to lead to victim’s failure. Here, the attacker and victim
share the same action space A.
Attacker Agent’s Reward: The reward is received when the
action is executed, meaning that the attacker agent chooses a
channel to jam and gets direct feedback from the environment.
The action of the DRL attacker and the victim at time t
are denoted as aAt and a
V
t respectively. Since both the DRL
attacker and the victim select one out of the N channels, the
sizes of their action spaces are the same. We assume that
there are proper mechanisms and measurements (such as SINR
levels, ACK signals) through which the attacker learns if the
victim has selected the same channel as the attacker itself,
i.e., aAt = a
V
t , and if the victim has transmitted successfully.
The goal of the attacking DRL agent is to learn the victim’s
activity pattern so that it can jam the channels selected by the
victim as much as possible. Based on this objective, we define
the reward of the DRL attacker at time t as
rt =

+1 if aAt = a
V
t and victim selects a good channel,
+0.5 if aAt = a
V
t and victim selects a bad channel,
−0.5 if aAt 6= aVt and victim selects a bad channel,
−1 if aAt 6= aVt and victim selects a good channel.
(2)
Within this setting, the DRL agent is encouraged to select the
same good channels as the victim as its first priority. We also
consider the case in which the attacker and victim select the
same bad channel as partial success in terms of jamming.
1) Attacker Agent’s Actor-Critic Structure: The actor-critic
structure consists of two neural networks, namely the actor
network and critic network. The parameters of these two neural
networks are initialized and updated as follows:
Actor: The actor is employed to explore a policy pi, that
maps the agent’s observation Φ to the action space A:
piϑ(Φ) : Φ→ A. (3)
Therefore, the mapping policy piϑ(Φ) is a function of the
observation Φ and is parameterized by ϑ. And the chosen
action can be denoted as
aA = piϑ(Φ) (4)
where we have aA ∈ A. Since the action space is discrete, we
use softmax function at the output layer of the actor network
so that we can obtain the scores of each action. The scores
sum up to 1 and can be regarded as the probabilities to obtain
a good reward by choosing the corresponding actions.
Critic: The critic is employed to estimate the value function
V (Φ). At time instant t, when the action aAt is chosen by the
actor network, the agent will execute it in the environment
and send the current observation Φt along with the feedback
from the environment to the critic. The feedback includes the
reward rt and the updated observation Φt+1. Then, the critic
calculates the TD error:
δt = rt + γVµ(Φt+1)− Vµ(Φt) (5)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Update: The critic is updated by minimizing the least
squares temporal difference (LSTD):
V ∗ = arg min
Vµ
(δt)
2 (6)
where V ∗ denotes the optimal value function.
The actor is updated by policy gradient. Here, we use the
TD error to compute the policy gradient1:
∇ϑJ(ϑ) = Epiϑ [∇ϑ log piϑ(Φ, aA)δt] (7)
where piϑ(Φ, aA) denotes the score of action aA under the
current policy. Then, the weighted difference of parame-
ters in the actor at time t can be denoted as ∆ϑt =
α∇ϑt log piϑt(Φt, aAt )δt, where α ∈ (0, 1) is the learning
rate. And the actor network can be updated using the gradient
decent method:
ϑt+1 = ϑt + α∇ϑt log piϑt(Φt, aAt )δt. (8)
B. Operational Modes
Once the DRL agent is initialized, it switches between two
different modes: listening mode and attacking mode.
• Listening mode: In this mode, the DRL agent only ob-
serves the environment and updates its own policy based
on the reward, but does not jam the selected channels so
that the victim is not influenced and does not adopt a new
policy.
• Attacking phase: In this mode, the DRL agent jams the
selected channels and decides whether to update its neural
networks based on the victim’s performance. When the
victim performs well, the DRL agent should evolve its
1In (7), policy gradient is denoted by ∇ϑJ(ϑ) where J(ϑ) stands for
the policy objective function, which is generally formulated as the statistical
average of the reward.
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Fig. 4. Stop-retrain-attack procedure of dynamic attack: 1© initial attack 2©
stop attack 3© start retraining 4© stop retraining and start attack 5© stop
updating the model
policy as the victim gradually adapts to the attacker’s
influence. However, when the victim performs poorly, the
DRL agent should stop learning from the reward. Be-
cause in this situation the victim may frequently choose
channels in bad states, and the reward may misguide the
attacker.
We assume that the victim’s model is pre-trained so that
the victim’s activity pattern is stable when the attacker starts
to train its own neural networks. In this training phase, the
DRL attacking agent works in the listening mode. And when
the DRL agent is well trained, it can start the dynamic attack
which we describe in detail in the following subsection.
C. Dynamic Attack
The DRL attacker uses the stop-retrain-attack (SRA) pro-
cedure shown in Fig. 4. DRL attacker aims at avoiding the
situation in which the victim learns a totally new action policy
once the model is well trained. For this purpose, the duration
of each cycle of the DRL attacker is fixed at a certain value
that prevents the victim to update to a new policy.
As shown in Fig. 4, the DRL attacker starts its first attack
at time 1© when the victim model has been working in a
stable fashion and working well. Before this point, the DRL
attacker works in listening phase to learn the victim’s activity
pattern, and we assume that at time 1©, the DRL attacker
can also function well with high stability. Once the attack is
initiated, the performance of the victim drops rapidly. In this
process, the victim keeps updating its model to overcome the
influence of the attacks, and at the same time, the attacker also
keeps updating its model to adapt to the victim’s changing
policy. However, we should note that the attacker is always
encouraged to choose the same channel as the victim does.
Hence, when the victim is forced to explore other channels
which are not attacked in order to find a new policy to
counteract against the attacks, it cannot avoid but try bad
channels in order to find the good ones. From the perspective
of DRL attacker, there is no need to follow the victim’s
selection because the victim’s model updates dramatically and
the policy may perform worse initially. On the one hand, it
is difficult for the attacker to learn an unstable policy. On
the other hand, copying the bad policy may give victim the
chance to recover its performance. Based on this idea, the DRL
attacker stops updating when the performance of the victim is
lower than a threshold and we mark this time instant as time
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Fig. 5. Victim’s accuracy under DRL attacker’s SRA procedure. The victim
does not employ an -greedy policy (i.e.,  = 0).
5©. Though the DRL attacker model stops learning, it still
works in attacking mode, so the performance of the victim
continues to decrease. As mentioned before, the DRL attacker
should stop jamming the channels before the victim adapts to
its attacks, because the victim is also a reinforcement learning
agent that has the ability to act against attacks naturally. At
time 2©, the victim’s performance starts to recover, meaning
that a new policy is being formed in the victim model. To
avoid pushing the victim to the new policy further, the DRL
attacker needs to switch to the listening mode at time 2© to
encourage the victim to return to its old policy as quickly as
possible. And at time 3©, the victim is able to perform as
well as that before the attack, and the DRL attacker will start
to retrain its model and keep working in listening mode to
adjust its policy based on the victim’s activity until time 4©
when the DRL attacker switches to attacking mode and starts
a new cycle. In our implementation, the duration of each cycle
is fixed to 2000 time slots, and the gap between time 3© and
4© is fixed at 200 time slots. Also, in the experiments, the
duration between time 2© and 3© is very small.
D. Experiments
In this section, we test the proposed DRL attacker with a
well-trained victim model and channel pattern introduced in
Section II.
First, we test the DRL attacker under the condition that
victim model works with  = 0 to show its full power. In
Fig. 5, we plot the victim’s accuracy over time to show the at-
tackers’ performance. The victim’s policy crashes immediately
after the DRL attacker starts jamming the channels at time slot
t = 2000. However, the victim’s policy can recover only for a
short period of time after a few thousands of time slots. These
brief recoveries are due to the fact that, as a reinforcement
learning-based agent, the DRL attacker operates with an -
greedy policy with  = 0.1. The randomness in the DRL
attacker’s policy leads to a small chance for the victim to
recover its performance from time to time.
We note that it is not challenging for the proposed to
attacker to jam the channels selected by the victim most of
the time, and considering this, we consider the more adaptive
victim model with  = 0.1 in the following experiments
to show the performance of the proposed attacker facing a
stronger victim user. In Fig. 6, we plot the accuracy of the
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Fig. 6. Victim’s accuracy under DRL attacker’s SRA procedure. The victim
employs -greedy policy with  = 0.1.
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Fig. 7. Empirical PDF of victim’s accuracy under DRL attacker’s SRA
procedure.
stronger victim with  = 0.1 under DRL attacker’s SRA
procedure. The DRL attacker stops updating the policy when
the victim’s accuracy is lower than 30% and switches to the
listening mode when the victim’s accuracy recovers to higher
than 30% or if the duration of the current cycle is longer
that 2000 time slots. In the listening mode, the DRL attacker
reloads its initial policy and retrains for 200 time slots before
the next attacking mode starts. In Fig. 6, we observe that the
DRL attacker is able to have the victim’s performance drop
substantially and the recovery occurs over a very short period
of time but the performance drops again significantly, which
means that the victim operates with very low accuracy most of
the time. Hence, under the DRL attacker’s SRA procedure, the
victim’s accuracy is effectively limited to a low level. We also
note that the pattern in Fig. 6 is similar to the one predicted
in Fig. 4.
Next, we plot the corresponding empirical probability den-
sity function (PDF) and empirical cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the moving average of victim’s accuracy in
Figs. 7 and 8 based on the accuracy results. Note that, to obtain
the empirical PDF and CDF, we start collecting the accuracy
data following the initial attack phase at time t = 2000. In Fig.
7, we observe that the victim’s accuracy is highly concentrated
around the level of 0.1, and the corresponding empirical CDF
in Fig. 8 exceeds 80% when the accuracy is around 0.2. These
results further indicate that the victim’s accuracy is very low
in the presence of jamming attacks. Specifically, the victim
achieves accuracy levels of 0.2 or less around 80% of the
time.
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Fig. 8. Empirical CDF of victim’s accuracy under DRL attacker’s SRA
procedure.
E. Impact of Limits on Attacker Power Budget
In the SRA process, DRL attacker is assumed to always
perform jamming attacks during the attacking phase, and stop
during the listening phase periodically. To control the jamming
power consumption, we in this section consider a budget
on how frequently the attacker can perform jamming during
the attack stage. In each time slot, the actor of attacker’s
actor-critic DRL agent gives an array of probabilities that the
attacker should attack each of the channels, and the attacker
attacks the channel with the highest probability pattack,max(t).
Due to the limited power budget, the attacker now only attacks
when pattack,max(t) is higher than a threshold pθ, otherwise
it pauses the attacks and listens. Within each period of T time
slots, if the attacker has already attacked more than bTθc
times, it ceases the attacks until the next period so that the
average jamming power consumption is limited by θ fraction
of the peak jamming power, where 0 < θ < 1. At the
end of the current period, the attacker updates the threshold
pθ with the recorded probabilities {pattack,max(t), for t =
t0, t0 + 1, . . . , t0 + T − 1}. We rearrange the T probabilities
in descending order, and pick the bTθucth lowest probability
as the updated threshold pθ, where, for instance, we can set
θu = θ.
It is obvious that the actual ratio of attacked time slots is less
than or equal to θ, because the distribution of pattack,max(t)
fluctuates over time, but pθ is determined by the probabilities
of the last period. If the probabilities in the current time period
grow higher, the attacker tends to select more time slots to
attack, and reach the threshold bTθc before t = t0 + T − 1,
and then stop until the next period. In such a period, the attack
ratio is θ. On the contrary, if the probabilities drop lower, the
attacker tends to choose less time slots to attack. Due to this,
it will potentially not reach the threshold bTθc, and the attack
ratio is less than θ. Both scenarios occur in our simulations,
and therefore the average attack ratio generally becomes less
than θ. Due to this, one may consider setting θu > θ, so
that the first case (higher probabilities) is experienced more
frequently and the second case less frequently. With this,
the attack ratio increases. However, we have experienced that
the victim accuracy also increases, which means we attack
more frequently, but the attacker is weaker than the original
setting θu = θ. It turns out that this modified attack policy
tends to perform unnecessary attacks and the pattern is more
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Fig. 10. Empirical distribution of the length of consecutive jamming attacks
predictable and hence less difficult to learn by the victim. Due
to this, in the following experiments, we use θu = θ, and call
this attack power budget parameter θ as the attack rate since
this is also a measure of how frequently jamming attacks are
performed within a given period.
In Fig. 9, we plot the victim’s accuracy as a function of
the attack rate θ with T = 1000. Different values of T lead
to similar curves. In this figure, we notice the elbow point at
θ = 0.3. Increasing the attack rate beyond this limit will not
lead to a significant drop in the victim’s accuracy. Therefore,
θ = 0.3 is a relatively reasonable budget on the attack rate,
at which victim’s accuracy is still suppressed to 34.6%. Fig.
10 shows the empirical distribution of different lengths of
consecutive jamming attacks. All jamming attacks are less
than 10 time slots long (indicating that we have consecutive
jamming attacks over at most 10 time slots before the attacker
agent stops), and the peak is experienced at 1, so the jamming
attack emission is intermittent and steady.
Above, we see that even the budgeted attack performs well
in the absence of defensive strategies. In the following sec-
tions, we remove the budget constraint from the attacker agent
and propose and test different defense strategies against the
full power attacker, which represents the worst case scenario
from the victim’s perspective.
IV. DIVERSIFIED DEFENSE WITH PID CONTROL
As shown in the last section, a jamming attack will lead
to a significant drop in victim’s accuracy. In the following
three sections, we assume that the observed sudden decrease
in accuracy is due to an attack, and we will address detection
of attacks in subsection VII-D. In this section, we introduce a
diversified defense strategy that utilizes proportional-integral-
derivative (PID) control based on recorded victim accuracy
history, so that this strategy is universally applicable to any
other type of adversarial jamming attacks.
A. Diversified Defense
Aforementioned attacker agent can choose one channel at
a time to perform the jamming attack, block victims trans-
mission and significantly interrupt its learning process. In the
presence of such attacks, we have observed in Section III that
the victim without any defense will have significantly lower
accuracy. As the attacker continuously learns from interactions
with the environment and victim, traditional defense methods
[30] do not work against such an attacker. If the victim
attempts to predict which channel will be attacked and chooses
a less wanted one on purpose, it will fall into a dilemma: the
less the victim user deviates from the DRL policy, the weaker
defense we have; the more it deviates from the DRL policy, the
more likely that the victim model will suffer due to frequent
selection of channels in bad state.
One alternative approach is to choose one channel from
multiple options according to a certain probability distribution
[31]. The actor of victim actor-critic DRL agent provides an
array of predicted probabilities pvictim of each channel being
in good state. The original setting is to choose the channel with
the highest pvictim, but now we rank them in descending order
of pvictim, and assign a fixed array of probabilities that we
choose for each channel. (In the original scheme, the second
and third highest pvictim vary several orders of magnitude
over time, and highest probability can get close to 1, making
the channel selection more predictable.) That is to say, for
the channels i = 1, 2, . . . , N listed in the descending order of
the original probabilities determined by the DRL agent (which
may correspond to different channels at different times), we
assign a fixed probability array {p(1), p(2), . . . , p(N)}, where∑N
i=1 p(i) = 1 and p(i) decreases as i increases. Then the
probability that the victim user chooses channel i is
P{avictim(t) = i} = p(i). (9)
However, such a strategy fails to utilize the victim accuracy
and has limited performance. To address this, we propose an
additional PID control as discussed next.
B. PID Control
PID controller is a feedback control system [32]. The error
e(t) is defined as the difference between the desired goal and
measured position. PID controller calculates the weighted sum
of proportional, integral, and derivative terms of e(t) to adjust
the control variable u(t) as shown below:
u(t) = Kpe(t) +Ki
∫ t
0
e(t′)dt′ +Kd
de(t)
dt
(10)
where Kp, Ki, Kd are constant weights.
This approach is widely used to optimize automatic control
since it can effectively correct systematic discrepancies and
dampen oscillations. However, if we simply use the strat-
egy with probabilities selected as in (9), the probability to
choose a channel will not change, regardless of how high
or low the channel access accuracy becomes. Typically, as
discussed in Section III, dynamic attacker stops attacking and
learns from the recovered victim periodically. Thus, when the
accuracy abnormally increases, we also desire to suppress it
by increasing the probability of accessing channels that are
potentially in bad states. We apply the idea of PID control,
and calculate the short term average, long term average and
long term difference of victim channel access accuracy. We
add these modified PID components to the probability array
to dampen accuracy oscillations. For channels i = 1, 2, . . . , N
listed in the descending order of pvictim, and for given victim
channel access accuracy α(t), and constant arrays p(i), Kp(i),
Ki(i), Kd(i), we modify (9) as follows:
P{avictim(t) = i} = P{i}(t) = P
′{i}(t)∑N
i′=1 P
′{i′}(t)
(11)
where
P ′{i}(t) = max{P ′′{i}(t), 0} and (12)
P ′′{i}(t) = p(i) +Kp(i)
t−1∑
t′=t−10
α(t′) +Ki(i)
t−1∑
t′=t−200
α(t′)
+Kd(i)
(
t−1∑
t′=t−200
α(t′)−
t−201∑
t′=t−400
α(t′)
)
.
(13)
We have Kp(i), Ki(i), Kd(i) increase as i increases. When
the accuracy is low, this will boost the probability to choose
channels predicted to be in good states and suppress the
probability of choosing channels in potentially bad states, and
vice versa. Thus, we improve the performance of the victim,
while keeping the attacker confused at the same time.
V. DIVERSIFIED DEFENSE WITH AN IMITATION ATTACKER
In this section, we propose another diversified defense
strategy which assumes that the attacker operates using an
actor-critic DRL agent. As the victim has access to all the time
series information with which the attacker trains its agent, it
can train its own imitation actor-critic DRL attacker, which
may have different neural network parameters and reward
assignment from the true attacker. However, as both of them
share the same goal to choose the victim’s channel, the policy
of the imitation attacker is expected to converge to that of the
true attacker. This property of deep learning is called transfer-
ability [33].
Simply switching to the channel with the second highest
probability when the imitation attacker provides a prediction of
possible channels to be jammed is not a very effective strategy,
because the dynamic DRL attacker can still learn from this
pattern. Thus, we introduce another diversified defense to
confuse the attacker with help from the imitation attacker by
modifying (9). Given that i is the channel index rearranged in
descending order of the probabilities provided by the victim
DRL actor (considering which the original victim user chooses
the first one, i.e., the channel with index i = 1) and given
that the imitation attacker chooses channel aimitation, the
probability that victim chooses channel i is given as
P{avictim(t) = i} =
{
1(i = 1) if aimitation(t) 6= 1
p(i) if aimitation(t) = 1
(14)
where {p(i)} is a fixed set of probabilities (generally selected
in a way to satisfy p(1) < .5 and p(2) > p(3) > p(4) > . . . >
p(N)) and 1(·) is the indicator function.
Within this setting, when the true attacker has an accurate
prediction, the victim gets the same information from its
imitation attacker and assigns larger probabilities to channels
that had originally lower probabilities assigned by the DRL
channel access agent, and the attacker can barely learn from
this diversified selection. When the attack model collapses
and fails to attack, the victim simply relies on its prediction
made by the DRL multichannel access agent, and is almost
unaffected by the attack.
VI. DEFENSE VIA ORTHOGONAL POLICIES
In this section, we introduce a defense strategy with or-
thogonal policies based on transition matrices without having
any assumptions on the attacker and environment. Given
action space A, if a policy chooses action a1 at time t and
action a2 at time t + τ and receives positive reward for
both actions, we define this transition from a1 to a2 as a
successful τ th order transition. We collect all such transitions
for orders τ = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T during a certain observation time
period, and add up to a set of transition frequency matrices
of size N × N , where N is the total number of actions,
and the component at row a1 and column a2 in the matrix
corresponding to the τ th order transitions describes the number
of τ th order transitions from action a1 to a2. We then define
the normalized correlation of two transition matrices Mpi1τ ,
Mpi2τ of the same order τ from different policies pi1, pi2 as
R(pi1, pi2, τ) =
Mpi1τ ◦Mpi2τ∑
a1∈A
∑
a2∈A
Mpi1τ [a1, a2]×
∑
a1∈A
∑
a2∈A
Mpi2τ [a1, a2]
(15)
where ◦ denotes element-wise Hadamard product, and
Mpiτ [a1, a2] denotes the element at row a1 and column a2
in the matrix corresponding to the τ th order transitions of
policy pi. We define orthogonal policies as policies that have
negligible normalized correlation. Since the orthogonal poli-
cies almost share no common action transitions, they have
the longest distance in the action transition space. Therefore,
once the attacker adapts to one of the orthogonal policies, it
is difficult for the attacker agent to adapt to other orthogonal
policies. Taking advantage of this, we minimize the normalized
correlation to train a set of orthogonal policies. As an effective
defensive strategy, the victim agent can switch between these
orthogonal policies when being attacked.
To apply this idea in the multichannel access defense
problem, we design an iterative training process to train two
orthogonal policies as depicted in Fig. 11. We start with two
copies of the trained victim model (as described in Section
II), namely policy 1 and policy 2, and train them to minimize
the normalized correlation between policy 1 and 2 alternately,
····policy 1 train    policy 1   observe policy 2train    policy 2   observe policy 1train    policy 1   observe
Fig. 11. Training process for constructing two orthogonal policies
so that each policy gradually deviates from each other, and
becomes orthogonal. In each period, for example, we train
policy 1 with high exploration probability  = 0.9 to force
it to explore a random channel with designed probability
distribution P (t), and then set  = 0 for a short duration
in listening mode to observe this trained policy and record its
transition matrices Mpi1τ , τ = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T .
The probability distribution P (t) is generated from policy
2 transition matrices Mpi2τ , τ = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T observed in the
last period. If policy 1 leads to the choice of channel a(τ) at
time t− τ , we extract the probability array as
p(τ) = normalize
(
1
Mpi2τ [a(τ), :] + 1
)
(16)
where Mpi2τ [a(τ), :] is the a(τ)th row of τ th order transition
matrix for policy 2, and the normalization is introduced so
that the probabilities are non-negative and sum up to one (as
in (11) and (12)). Therefore, we have the following weighted
sum of such probability distributions over different τs:
P (t) = normalize
(
T∑
τ=1
%τ−1ητ
(
p(τ)− 1
N
)
+
1
N
)
(17)
where N is the total number of channels, 0 < % < 1 is decay
factor, and ητ is the indicator whether agent received positive
reward at time t− τ :
ητ =
{
+1.5 if r(t− τ) = 1
−0.5 if r(t− τ) = −1. (18)
This distribution guarantees transitions that often appear
in policy 2 are less explored by policy 1, which leads to
orthogonality. Among these intensively explored transitions,
DRL agent will only learn these successful actions, so the
trained policies will be intermediate between p(τ) and the
underlying environment, and maintain an acceptable accuracy.
We should be aware of one potential risk of this training
strategy, that two policies might tend to choose two non-
overlapping subset of channels. Such pair of policies has low
normalized correlation, but the mixed transition pattern is easy
to learn by the attacker, i.e., an averaged transition map works
perfect as an attack whichever policy is picked. Therefore,
we introduce a regularization term to (17). When we train
one policy, for example policy 1, we also record how many
successful actions were performed during the last policy 2
observation period in a 1-dimensional array preg . With this,
we have the regularized distribution
P (t) = normalize
(
T∑
τ=1
%τ−1ητ
(
p(τ)− 1
N
)
+
1
N
+ βpreg
)
(19)
where 0 < β < 1 is a weight factor. We intend, but not
force, to lead the two policies to choose the same subset of
channels, so that the mixed transition pattern is much harder
to learn by the attacker. An additional benefit is that we can
use a higher learning rate to train the policies. An actor-critic
agent might collapse by choosing one channel forever without
exploring other channels when the learning rate is too high,
but the regularization term leads it to explore a chosen subset
of channels by the other policy, and avoid such a collapse.
Therefore, we are able to use higher learning rates to train
faster.
VII. EXPERIMENTS WITH DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES
In this section, we test the proposed defense strategies
against the well-trained dynamic attacker described in section
III. Before the experiments start, the victim is trained over
500000 time slots and the attacker has another 200000 time
slots until convergence. The trained victim starts at t = 0, and
the trained attacker initiates attacking at t = 2000. As victim
accuracy drops dramatically, defense agents start at t = 2400.
In all diversified defense cases, we set  = 0 (the probability
to choose a channel randomly) at the victim DRL agent, as
we have already deployed better randomized strategies.
A. Diversified PID Defense
First, we test the diversified PID defense described in Sec-
tion IV. We plot the moving average of the victim’s accuracy in
Fig. 12. During the initial 2000 time slots, the victim without
the attacker performs well, but when the attack starts, the
accuracy drops below 20%. As observed in Fig. 6, the victim
without any defense will have an average accuracy of 14%.
Shortly afterwards, PID defense is initiated and the attacker
model gradually collapses, so the victim accuracy rises to
39%, which is close to a half of the victim’s performance
in the absence of a jamming attacker. In this experiment, the
underlying channel pattern has 2 out of 16 channels in good
condition, and the attacker knows if the chosen channel is
good and if the victim also chooses it after the attack. Thus,
this result means that although the attacker learns from the
victim’s choice, we have managed to confuse the attacker to
some extent.
Figs. 13 and 14 show the corresponding empirical PDF and
CDF of PID converged performance. Note that we have made
an additional assumption only for the PID case that after being
attacked, the victim knows if the chosen channel was good
before attack. In this case, we set the victim reward as 0.5 (to
indicate a partially good choice) instead of -1, encouraging the
victim to try the underlying good channels. As PID assigns
more randomness to channel selection, it is necessary to lead
the victim towards good channels even if they have been
attacked, to avert victim model from collapsing. The converged
accuracy without such an assumption is about 30%.
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Fig. 12. Victim’s accuracy with diversified defense involving PID control.
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Fig. 13. Empirical PDF of victim’s accuracy under diversified PID defense.
B. Diversified Imitation Defense
Next we test the diversified imitation defense described in
Section V. We start to train the imitation attacker before the
attack starts as well as the true attacker, but the reward setting
is different. Given that the attacker chooses channel aattacker,
the victim chooses channel avictim, and the underlying good
channels are denoted by G = {i1, i2}, the reward of true
attacker rT (t) is
rT (t) =

+1 if aattacker = avictim and avictim ∈ G,
+0.5 if aattacker = avictim and avictim /∈ G,
−0.5 if aattacker 6= avictim and avictim /∈ G,
−1 if aattacker 6= avictim and avictim ∈ G.
(20)
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Fig. 14. Empirical CDF of victim’s accuracy under diversified PID defense.
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Fig. 15. Victim’s accuracy with diversified defense involving an imitation
attacker.
For the imitation attacker, we do not assume that the victim
knows if an attacked channel was good or not, and therefore
the imitation attacker only uses the criterion if it chooses the
same channel as the victim does after the victim deploys
diversified defense and switches to another channel. Thus,
given the victim’s channel selection avictim after the defense
strategy is deployed, and the imitation selection aimitation, the
reward of the imitation attacker rI(t) is
rI(t) =
{
+1 if aimitation = avictim,
−1 if aimitation 6= avictim.
(21)
We plot the moving average of the victim’s accuracy in
Fig. 15. Initially, we have a similar performance as in the
PID case, and after the diversified defense is initiated, the
performance gradually converges to 90% accuracy, indicating
an outstanding defense against jamming attacks. Comparing
with the performance without the attacker (shown in Fig. 2),
the achieved accuracy is lower than the case of  = 0, where
95% accuracy is attained, but higher than 85% accuracy that
is achieved with the -greedy policy.
We also observe the significantly improved performance
in accuracy in Figs. 16 and 17 where empirical PDF and
CDF are provided, respectively. We additionally note that
the number of layers and nodes in the imitation attacker’s
neural network does not affect the performance, as long as the
imitation attacker has the purpose to select the same channel
as the victim does. The reward assignment of the imitation
attacker can also vary. For instance, if we set it the same
as the true attacker as in (20) or simply use [avictim ∈ G],
the difference in the final accuracy is less than 2%. With
all different settings, imitation attacker converges to the true
attacker, with 82% probability on average in choosing the same
channel. So, this defense strategy is robust against different
settings, and successfully misleads the actor-critic dynamic
attacker, rendering it a very effective strategy against such
attacks.
C. Defense via Orthogonal Policies
As another defensive mechanism, we introduce two orthog-
onal polices as discussed in Section VI. Note that these two
policies are obtained via the victim neural networks. We retrain
two copies of the victim’s neural networks to minimize the
normalized correlation of their transition matrices. In Fig. 18,
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Fig. 16. Empirical PDF of victim’s accuracy under diversified imitation
defense.
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Fig. 17. Empirical CDF of victim’s accuracy under diversified imitation
defense.
we show the first three pairs of transition matrices for two
trained policies where  = 0 (the probability to choose a
random channel). We can see that policy 1 tends to select
the channels that have adjacent indices, while policy 2 skips
adjacent channels most of the time. In the absence of attacks,
policy 1 has an accuracy of 80.5% and policy 2 has an
accuracy of 71.5%. (Note that we should only use initial victim
model when there is no attack).
In the defense phase, we reload these two policies iteratively
to confuse the attacker, so that the attacker learns from one
policy to the other all the time, and fails to perform a perfect
attack. For every 2000 time slots, we check if victim accuracy
is lower than a certain threshold (e.g., 40%), and reload the
other model if current policy fails. In Fig. 19, we plot the
victim accuracy when orthogonal policies are deployed as a
defense strategy. The average accuracy increases from 14%
(before defense, as shown in Fig. 6) to about 52%. Since
the policy learned by the attacker is not orthogonal to the
two designed orthogonal policies, it can be more similar
to one of the two orthogonal policies (which is policy 1)
than to the other policy (which is policy 2). However, since
the two policies shown in Fig. 18 only share a few action
transitions, the attacker’s neural network cannot resume its
high performance in a short period of time. With our strategy
to switch policies as victim accuracy decreases, the overall
performance almost remains the same over time. Figs. 20 and
21 show the corresponding empirical PDF and CDF of the
accuracy.
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Fig. 18. First row: the transition matrices for policy 1 with τ = 1, 2, 3.
Second row: the transition matrices for policy 2 with τ = 1, 2, 3.
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Fig. 19. Victim’s accuracy with defense via orthogonal policies.
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
accuracy
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
fre
qu
en
cy
Fig. 20. Empirical PDF of victim’s accuracy under defense with orthogonal
policies.
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Fig. 21. Empirical CDF of victim’s accuracy under defense with orthogonal
policies.
D. Attack Detection
In the above evaluation of defense strategies, we have
assumed that a sudden drop in victim’s accuracy is always
due to an adversarial attack. However, when the statistical
description of the environment changes, the performance will
also diminish. Since it will take a long time to retrain the user’s
DRL model, it is critical to distinguish environmental change
from an adversarial jamming attack. Therefore, we propose an
attack detection strategy based on orthogonal policies defense
and diversified imitation defense.
We define the new environment as another round-robin
switching pattern, where the order of 16 channel list is
shuffled, and switch to this pattern occurs at t = 2000. Figs.
22 and 23 show how the accuracies of the users employ-
ing the orthogonal policies and imitation attacker strategy,
respectively, vary when the environment changes. On the one
hand, for the user with imitation defense, the performance
after an environmental change (as depicted in Fig. 23) is
not significantly different from that under a jamming attack
(see e.g., Fig. 15) as both converge towards 90% accuracy.
Therefore, imitation defense strategy does not work as a
detector of attacks although it performs well at last. Addi-
tionally, in the case of an environment change, the accuracy
recovers with more fluctuations and more slowly than the DRL
agent without defense strategies because of the disturbance
from the imitation attacker. On the other hand, for the user
employing orthogonal policies, the accuracy almost goes to
zero immediately when the environment changes (Fig. 22),
which strongly contrasts to Fig. 19, where the accuracy under
jamming attack fluctuates around 55% as soon as the attack
starts, with a minimum above 20%.
Thus, we propose to use orthogonal policies as an attack
detection mechanism as follows. When the accuracy drops,
we can first apply the defense with orthogonal policies. If
the accuracy recovers and fluctuates with this approach, we
confirm that it is an adversarial jamming attack, and switch
to diversified imitation defense for better protection. The
performance in this scenario is provided in Fig. 24. If, on the
other hand, the accuracy does not recover even after orthogonal
policies, we decide that the environment has changed and we
retrain the DRL agent without initiating defense.
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Fig. 22. User’s accuracy with orthogonal policies defense when environment
changes
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Fig. 23. User’s accuracy with diversified imitation defense when environment
changes
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a dynamic actor-critic
DRL jamming attacker aimed at minimizing the accuracy of
a victim user performing dynamic multichannel access using
its own DRL agent. We have introduced the actor-critic archi-
tecture of the proposed DRL attacker, and then presented its
SRA working procedure. We have demonstrated that the DRL
attacker can perform effectively in the absence of defense. In
the performance evaluation of the DRL attacker, we have also
considered a jamming power budget, limiting the attack rate.
We have observed that with only 30% power consumption
(or equivalently attack rate), we can still suppress victim’s
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Fig. 24. Victim’s accuracy under attack with orthogonal policies defense as
detector at t = 2000, confirm the attack, and switch to diversified imitation
defense at t = 10000
accuracy to 34.6%. In these analyses, we have specifically
conducted experiments with a stronger victim that applies the
-greedy policy.
We also introduced three different diversified defense strate-
gies, namely PID control, imitation attacker and orthogonal
policies, against this attacker to improve the accuracy of
the victim DRL agent. We have investigated how to set the
probabilities in choosing different channels to confuse the
attacker. We note that the diversified PID defense neither
makes any assumption on the attacker nor acquires extra
training beforehand and in this setting leads the victim user to
reach an accuracy level of 39%. The diversified defense based
on the immitation attacker assumes that the attacker employs
an actor-critic DRL agent, and can attain a very high accuracy
(≈ 90%) and is robust to different settings. As to the defense
via orthogonal policies, we need to train the policies before
the attack with no assumptions, and we achieve an accuracy of
50%. Based on orthogonal policies, we have also introduced
an attack detection strategy that can differentiate attacks from
changes in the environment.
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